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Abstract 
Calibration research is concerned with the accuracy of 
confidence judgments made by individuals when 
responding to various cognitive tasks. Within the 
cognitive domain, research has demonstrated the 
existence of a trait of self-confidence that appears to be 
independent of the type of cognitive activity being 
investigated. However, the generality of this trait across 
other domains, such as personality assessment, remains 
largely unexplored. The present study addressed this by 
including a number of cognitive and personality 
assessment tasks within a single battery. It was expected 
that the usual general self-confidence factor would 
emerge in the structural analysis of the cognitive tasks 
and that this factor would also share variance with 
confidence measures obtained from the personality tasks. 
This study also investigated whether confidence and 
calibration differed as a function of ability level. A total 
of 127 participants completed the battery. Findings 
indicate that self-confidence did not differentiate from 
accuracy scores within the cognitive domain and that 
there was differentiation across the cognitive and 
personality domains. Also, low scorers were more mis-
calibrated than high scorers on one of the reasoning 
tasks.  
Introduction 
“I think therefore I am…… The end of study should 
be to direct the mind towards the enunciation of 
sound and correct judgments on all matters that 
come before it”. Descartes 1596-1650 
Sound and correct judgments are just as important today 
as they were in Descartes’ time as we are constantly 
faced with having to make judgments about some aspect 
of our daily lives. Whilst Descartes provided a general 
rule for cognitive activity, the focus of this paper is 
directed toward judgments that we make about 
ourselves in terms of our cognitive abilities and 
personality traits. Accurate self-assessment or self-
monitoring of our cognitive performance is a 
fundamental aspect of successful learning (Flavell, 
1977), and may be critical in many work situations. 
Similarly, research into the accuracy of self-perception  
has been “an issue of longstanding concern to 
philosophers and social scientists” (John & Robins, 
1994). The calibration paradigm (see below) will be 
used to assess self-monitoring within both the cognitive 
and personality domains.  
There are reliable findings that individuals tend to be 
overconfident or underconfident when evaluating the 
accuracy of their cognitive performance. Individuals are 
regarded as mis-calibrated if there is a mismatch 
between accuracy and confidence. Self-monitoring is 
operationalised by self-confidence scores, that is, 
individuals are asked to express how confident they are 
in the accuracy of their judgments, or answers to every 
item of a cognitive test. Bias scores indicate the size 
and direction of this mismatch and is simply the 
average of confidence ratings across all items in a task 
minus the proportion correct score for that task 
(Stankov & Crawford, 1996). A positive bias score 
suggests overconfidence whereas a negative score 
indicates underconfidence. Bias scores will be 
generated for the cognitive variables.  
Winman, Juslin, and Bjorkman (1998) found that 
individuals were well calibrated on tasks that required 
hindsight bias, and Stankov and Crawford, (1996) 
found good calibration on the Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices Test and digit span tasks. Individuals are 
underconfident when answering questions about future 
events (Vreugdenhil & Koele, 1988), judging line 
length (Bjorkman, Juslin, & Winman, 1993), however, 
underconfidence did not generalise to perceptual tasks 
in other sensory modalities (i.e., auditory, kinesthetic, 
gustatory, and olfactory) or to other visual perceptual 
tasks (e.g., a square gap task and the Muller Lyer 
Illusion) (Stankov, in press). In terms of 
overconfidence, there is a large body of evidence to 
suggest that individuals anticipate performance levels 
higher than their actual results (see review by Kleitman 
& Stankov, 2001).  
Of interest to the present study is that differential 
psychologists have demonstrated the existence of a trait 
of self-confidence that appears independent of the type 
of cognitive activity being investigated (c.f., Stankov, in 
press; Stankov & Dolph, 2000). Moreover, it has been 
argued that this general self-monitoring/self-confidence 
trait represents one aspect of metacognition related to 
the accuracy of self-assessment in the cognitive domain. 
Interestingly, the generality of this trait sets it apart 
from other known constructs such as self-efficacy 
where confidence is domain dependent. However, 
differential psychologists have so far failed to 
investigate the generality of this trait in other domains. 
Stankov (1999) has placed the confidence trait 
somewhere between the boundaries of intelligence and 
personality. If this is the case, it is possible that such a 
general trait could cut across into the personality 
domain if one refers to global self-concept theories 
where a collection of beliefs about oneself includes 
perceptions of appearance, personality, and abilities 
(Shavelson, Hubner, & Stanton, 1976). Investigating the 
generality of the self-confidence trait in the personality 
domain has important implications for calibration 
theorists trying to understand self-monitoring as current 
theoretical propositions cannot account for a number of 
research findings.  
Research Aims 
In order to assess confidence in the personality 
domain, five personality descriptions were constructed 
based on the trait adjectives from the International 
Personality Item Pool Five-Factor Personality Scale 
(IPIP; Goldberg, 1997) that assesses the dimensions of 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, 
Emotional Stability and Intellect. The IPIP adjectives 
were chosen because the personality dimensions are 
positive thereby lessening self-enhancement biases. A 
confidence measure will be obtained after participants 
indicate whether each personality description is an 
accurate description of that aspect of their personality. It 
was expected that the usual general self-confidence 
factor would emerge in the structural analysis of the 
cognitive tasks and that this factor would also share 
variance with confidence measures obtained from the 
personality tasks. One cognitive bias factor is also 
expected. 
Other individual differences apparent in the 
confidence literature of interest to the present study are 
that males tend to be more confident than females on 
cognitive tasks (Pulford & Colman, 1997) and that older 
individuals are more confident than younger individuals 
with cognitive tasks (Crawford & Stankov, 1996). We 
are also interested in the possibility that individual 
differences in confidence and mis-calibration could be 
linked to ability levels. Spence (1996) reported that 
experts are better calibrated than novices but the very 
early empirical literature on confidence suggests that  
those of lower ability tend to be more confident, a 
finding that is counterintuitive. More recently, Kruger 
and Dunning (1999) investigated whether low scorers 
on tests of humour, grammar and logic provided 
accurate self-assessments of their abilities. Results 
indicate that low scoring individuals “grossly 
overestimated their test performance and ability” 
(p.1121). Consequently, this important issue will be 
addressed in the current study by investigating whether 
significant differences are apparent in mis-calibration 
amongst participants who scored in the bottom quartile 
on a general knowledge test versus those who scored in 
the top quartile. It is predicted that low scorers will be 
more mis-calibrated than high scorers on tasks of 
cognitive abilities. A Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
will be used in order to compare mean bias scores. In a 
similar vein to Kruger and Dunning, tasks of 
acculturated knowledge and reasoning will be included 
in the test battery. Correlations will be used to examine 
the relationship between ability and self-confidence. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 127 individuals participated in this study. The 
sample comprised 40 males and 87 females, ranging in 
age from 17 to 74 years (M= 34.42, SD = 12.76). The 
highest educational level of the sample varied from 
completion of grade 7,8,9,10,11, or 12 (n = 77), to 
completion of tertiary studies (n =50). Sixty participants 
were enrolled in undergraduate Psychology courses at 
the University of Southern Queensland and received 
course credit in return for their participation. Snow ball 
sampling techniques were used to obtain a community 
sample of 67 participants. The experimenter randomly 
approached community organisations and provided 
individuals with a rationale for the study and asked 
respondents if they could recommend others who might 
be interested in participating in this research. The 
community sample came from both metropolitan and 
regional areas in Queensland.  
Materials 
Demographic questions consisted of items regarding, 
gender, age, and highest level of education. All 
participants completed a battery of five cognitive tasks, 
and five short descriptions of personality. Each of these 
measures is described below. 
General Knowledge Test (GKT-Stankov, 1997). This 
test covers knowledge of diverse areas such as history, 
and geography.  
Letter Series Test (LST-Stankov, 1997). Participants 
were presented with a series of letters (e.g., A, D, G, J, 
?) and were asked to provide the next letter of the 
series. A time limit of four minutes was given. 
Concealed Words Test (CWT-Stankov, 1997). 
Participants were asked to identify words when parts of 
each letter were degraded. Participants were given a 
time limit of two minutes.  
Esoteric Analogies Test (EST-Stankov, 1997). 
Participants were asked to choose words that completed 
verbal analogies. Four response options were provided. 
For example, LIGHT is to DARK as HAPPY is to 
GLAD, SAD, GAY, EAGER. A four minute time limit 
was imposed.  
Cattell’s Matrices (CM-Stankov, 1997). Participants 
were asked to choose from among six options the 
design that completes a matrix. Four minutes were 
allowed to complete this task. 
Participants were asked to provide an answer to 
every trail of the aforementioned tasks as well as a 
confidence rating indicating how confident they were 
that the answer provided was correct. For the open 
ended tests (i.e., GKT & LST) confidence ranged from 
0% (Just guessing) to 100% (Absolutely certain). For 
the other multiple choice tests, the starting point on the 
confidence scale was 100/k, where k = the number of 
response alternatives. 
Self-Rated Personality Descriptions based on the 
Trait Adjectives by Goldberg (1997). Five personality 
descriptions were constructed from the 100 item IPIP 
scale (Goldberg, 1997). For each of the five personality 
dimensions participants were presented with a 
personality description and were asked to rate the extent 
to which the overall description generally reflected their 
personality on a 11-point scale from -5 (Not like me) to 
5 (Like me). For example, the Extraversion personality 
description appears below: 
“I don’t mind being the centre of attention; I make 
friends easily; I take charge; I know how to 
captivate people; I feel at ease with people; I am 
skilled in handling social situations; I am the life 
of the party; I start conversations.” 
Following each description, participants provided their 
confidence rating after reading the following: 
“Imagine that there was some device that could 
accurately tell us about your personality. How 
confident are you that the rating you gave above 
would correspond with the device’s rating? Please 
rate your confidence on the scale that appears below 
by circling your level of confidence.” 
The confidence scale for the personality judgments, 
used 10% intervals and ranged from 0% (Just guessing) 
to 100% which indicated absolute certainty.  
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually after providing a 
rationale and explaining that all data would remain 
confidential. The test battery started with the GKT test 
for all participants. The order of the qualitative 
descriptors was randomised for each participant with the 
only constraint being that each descriptor be followed 
by a cognitive task. Participants were not informed of 
their accuracy during testing but were given feedback at 
the end of the experiment. The battery took 
approximately one hour to complete. 
Results 
Reliability coefficients, descriptive statistics, and 
correlations among accuracy, confidence and 
personality variables are presented in Table 1. All 
reliability estimates fall within acceptable limits for 
experimental research (Gregory, 1996). The factorial 
structure of the test battery was investigated using 
principal components analysis with oblimin rotation 
using the cognitive accuracy, cognitive confidence, and 
personality confidence variables. The CWT accuracy 
and confidence scores were deleted from the analysis as 
their measures of sampling adequacy fell below the 
recommended cut-off of .5 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). 
Three factors emerged, accounting for 67% of the total 
variance. The first factor was labelled acculturated 
knowledge as both the accuracy and confidence scores 
from the GKT and EST tasks loaded highly on it. The 
second factor had high loadings from all of the 
confidence ratings from the personality descriptors and 
was labelled personality confidence. A reasoning factor 
emerged as the last factor with high loadings from both 
the LST and CM accuracy and confidence scores. As 
mathematical dependence exists between the bias, 
accuracy and confidence scores a separate principal 
components analysis was undertaken using only the 
cognitive bias scores. One cognitive bias factor 
emerged from the data set accounting for 45.6% of the 
total variance.  
The intercorrelations between ability (measured by 
accuracy) and confidence scores in Table 1 are of 
interest to this study. Strong correlations (i.e., rs > .57) 
between accuracy and confidence scores were apparent 
for each of the tasks except for the CM test ( r = .38, p 
= .01). This indicates that for most tasks those with 
higher ability were also more confident in their 
performance on those tasks.  
Participants’ scores on the GKT task were divided 
into quartiles in order to investigate whether low scorers 
were more mis-calibrated than high scorers. A 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance was performed on 
the four dependent variables: LST, CWT, EST and CM 
bias scores with the independent variable being GKT 
quartile (first or fourth). Pillai’s F statistic was chosen 
as it is the most robust against violations of 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Using Pillai’s Trace, a 
difference between low and high scorers was found on 
the combined DVs F (4, 64) = 9.99, p < .05, with partial 
ŋ2 = .15. Thus, 15% of the variance on the composite 
Dvs can be uniquely attributed to differences between 
low and high scorers. As there was no theoretical 
justification for ordering the Dvs a bonferroni 
adjustment (α = .01) was used to evaluate univariate 
analyses. This resulted in one significant difference 
between the means for EST bias scores (F (1,67) = 
8.802, p < .004, with partial ŋ2 = .12). This indicates 
that low scorers were significantly more biased on the 
EST than were high scorers and that 12% of the 
variance can be attributed to the differences between 
these groups.  
Discussion 
The present study was designed to investigate whether 
the cognitive trait of self-confidence generalised to the 
domain of personality assessment, and whether 
individual differences in ability levels contributed to 
mis-calibration and to confidence ratings. Contrary to 
expectations, a general confidence factor did not 
emerge from this data set. Confidence and accuracy 
scores loaded together and formed two separate factors 
(i.e., acculturated knowledge and reasoning). Whilst 
this finding is inconsistent with some of the research 
literature (see Stankov, in press for a review), it is not 
unheard of as there are instances in the literature where 
a general confidence factor failed to emerge when 
correlations between confidence and accuracy scores 
were greater than .5 (c.f., Stankov & Dolph, 2000). In 
the present study, the average correlation between 
confidence and accuracy scores was .66 thereby 
providing one explanation for our inconsistent findings. 
In terms of the bias scores, however, our results are 
consistent with previous research findings where bias 
scores from differing cognitive domains loaded together
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Reliability Coefficients, and Correlations between Main Variables (N = 127) 
 
 M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Cognitive Accuracy       
1.GKTAC (20 items) .40 .20 .79 1.00          
2. LSTAC (15 items) .61 .18 .66 .20 1.00         
3. CWTAC (26 items) .26 .11 .64 .19 .13 1.00        
4. ESTAC (24 items) .60 .16 .73 .61 .27 .13 1.00       
5. CMAC (11 items)  .76 .15 .55 .32 .44 .15 .23 1.00      
Cognitive Confidence              
6. GKTC .45 .20 .86 .84 .19 .16 .60 .25 1.00     
7. LSTC .61 .15 .78 .25 .58 .17 .34 .36 .33 1.00    
8. CWTC .26 .12 .78 .04 -.03 .85 .09 -.01 .12 .15 1.00   
9. ESTC .66 .17 .90 .41 .09 .07 .69 .07 .53 .33 .19 1.00  
10. CMC .86 .13 .86 .31 .24 .19 .30 .38 .37 .54 .23 .52 1.00 
Personality Confidence              
11. CONC - - - -.20 -.03 -.15 -.05 -.23 -.19 -.07 -.12 .06 .01 
12. EMOTC - - - -.02 .09 .07 .09 -.06 -.03 .02 .11 .10 .10 
13. INTELLC - - - .04 .01 .09 .12 .04 .07 .01 .11 .15 .22 
14. EXTRAC - - - -.17 .09 -.04 .04 .01 -.11 -.06 -.04 .10 .09 
15. AGREEC - - - -.12 -.04 -.08 .02 -.17 -.09 .04 .00 .12 .09 
Table 1 (contd) M SD α 11 12 13 14 15      
11. CONC    1.00          
12. EMOTC    .49 1.00         
13. INTELLC    .38 .42 1.00        
14. EXTRAC    .46 .41 .32 1.00       
15. AGREEC    .49 .55 .54 .36 1.00      
Note.   rs ≥.16 are significant at the .05 level, and rs ≥.23 are significant at the .01 level. GKT= General Knowledge; LST = Letter 
Series; EST = Esoteric Analogies; CWT = Concealed Words; CM = Cattell’s Matrices; CONC= Conscientiousness; EMOTC= 
Emotional stability; INTELLC = Intellect; EXTRAC = Extraversion; AGREEC= Agreeableness.  
 
 
onto one factor (c.f., Stankov, in press; Stankov & 
Dolph, 2000). Our results indicate that if individuals 
were mis-calibrated in the reasoning domain then they 
were also mis-calibrated in the acculturated knowledge 
domain.  
Regarding personality confidence, a separate factor 
emerged that was essentially uncorrelated (rs < .002) 
with the cognitive factors. This finding does not fit with 
a model that shows a confidence trait sitting between 
the personality and ability domains (Stankov, 1999). 
However, there are some methodological issues to be 
resolved regarding the assessment of confidence in the 
personality domain and it is still unclear whether 
personality confidence shares variance with a 
confidence factor derived from the ability domain. 
Future research could address this issue by including a 
diverse battery of cognitive and personality assessment 
tasks and by trialing different methods of assessing 
confidence in personality judgments. Interestingly, 
correlations between confidence ratings in the 
personality domain were as high if not higher than 
correlations between confidence ratings from the 
cognitive tasks suggesting the presence of a general 
confidence factor in personality judgments. Indeed, we 
have replicated these correlations in a subsequent study. 
However, the generality of a personality confidence 
factor across other personality judgments remains 
unexplored. Perhaps it could be argued by some 
calibration researchers that the personality confidence 
judgments were of a global nature and may be more 
similar to post-test evaluative confidence judgments 
in the cognitive domain. With this type of judgment 
individuals are asked to predict how many items they 
believed were correct after completing a test and are 
then asked to provide a confidence rating. Factor 
analyses of post-test confidence and item-by-item 
confidence estimates in the cognitive domain results 
in two separate factors. We therefore examined in a 
subsequent study whether there is differentiation 
between item-by-item confidence estimates versus 
global confidence estimates in the personality domain 
and preliminary analyses indicate one confidence 
factor.  
There was partial support for the hypothesis that 
low scorers on tasks of cognitive abilities would be 
more mis-calibrated than high scorers. Significant 
differences were found for the EST task that taps both 
reasoning acculturated knowledge. Low scorers were 
overconfident (bias score = 11) whereas high scorers 
were well calibrated. Perhaps this task was novel to a 
number of the low scorers in the community sample 
and therefore they were unaware of how they 
performed. The finding for the EST task parallels the 
work of Kruger and Dunning (1999) who found that low 
scorers overrated their test performance. For the other 
tasks, there were no significant differences in terms of 
mis-calibration between low and high scorers. Perhaps 
this could be attributed to sample differences as the 
present study comprised both university students and 
individuals from the general population whereas Kruger 
and Dunning’s sample were university students. In 
terms of the relationship between ability and self-
confidence, we found that those with higher ability were 
also more confident in their performance. This finding 
is consistent with expectations but modifies claims by 
researchers such as Kruger and Dunning that less 
capable people are more confident than they should be 
about their performance. We have found some evidence 
of this tendency through the analyses of bias scores but 
these correlations between confidence and accuracy 
show that those who know more are also more confident 
about that knowledge. 
So, do we know what we think we know about our 
cognitive performance? Bias scores indicated good 
calibration for all tasks except the CM test. A bias score 
of 10 for the CM test is consistent with previous 
research using tests of a similar nature (e.g., Pallier et 
al., 2002) and in this sample participants appeared 
unaware that they had made errors. With regard to 
personality, the answer remains unclear as we do not yet 
have an objective criterion by which to determine the 
accuracy of personality judgments. We are currently 
working on other methods of deriving these measures.  
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